PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MENTALISTIC LOGIC
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17721/sophia.2019.14.9Keywords:
philosophy of logic, philosophy of mind, psychologistic logic, folk psychologyAbstract
Paper deals with philosophical problems of mentalistic logic. Mentalistic logic is a formal system that concentrates on underpinning processes of mental life instead of certain elements of extrinsic rational behavior as most of existing logics (like BDI calculi) do. The project is compared to the existing logics of actions. Mentalistic logic is patually a formal system and partually phenomenological study of human mind. We presume formal signs such as propositions and modal operators refer to mental states and can describe the general structure of mental activity. That is purely the approach of classical phenomenology – the study of experience and its structures. On the other hand the usage of formal logic is a classic analytic philosophy of mind. So the things are getting more complicated when taking in consideration that the initial framework of a study is analytic philosophy and not continental phenomenology. Phenomenology is of different intellectual and methodological tradition than any type of analytic philosophy including analytic philosophy of mind. From that stanpoint it may be said that paper is also interesting as a purely methodological project – it tries to find bridges between phenomenology and philosophy of mind. As for the action logics, mentalistic logic also studies rational behavior but does it on the other lever and often with a different purpose. The main problem in this case is philosophical interpretation of modality. Minor problems include shared content, many leveled self-referential structures and vagueness. The paper also studies brain in a vatt thought experiment as a methodological concept. The research will have implications for philosophy of logic, artificial intelligence and theory of reference.
References
Chalmers D. J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory / David Chalmers. – New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996. – 432 p.
Chalmers D. J. The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief / David Chalmers. // Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003. – Р. 220–272.
Dennett D. Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness / Daniel Dennett // Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. – Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1978. – Р. 163–188.
Fodor J. A. The Modularity of Mind / Jerry Fodor. – Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1983. – 145 p.
Kyburg Henry E. Jr. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief / Henry Kyburg // Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961. – 346 p.
Levesque H. J. On Acting Together / Hector Levestsque et al. // Proceedings AAAI '90, 1990. – P. 94–99.
Lindström S. W. DDL Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents. / S. Lindström and W. Rabinowicz. – Erkenntnis. – № 50 – Р. 353–385.
Odifreddi P. G. Classical Recursion Theory. / P. Odifreddi. – Amsterdam : North Holland; second edition, 1999. – 686 p.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
